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Notice and Consent: A Healthy Balance Between 
Privacy and Innovation for Wearables 
fK==fkqolar`qflk=
In our culture of continuous technological advancement, society 
has never more effectively monitored and interpreted the daily actions 
of individual living. At the core of data monitoring advancements are 
wearable devices (“wearables”), which are often worn directly on the 
bodies of individuals and used to capture, aggregate, and analyze a wide 
range of personal health data. Such devices not only provide individu-
als greater insight into their daily actions, but also present an oppor-
tunity to share generated information with interested third-parties, in-
cluding health care providers and insurance companies. Continued 
user adoption has positioned wearables not only to be an important 
consumer product, but also to command significant regulatory atten-
tion. While meaningful benefits likely accompany such widespread 
adoption, have the unavoidable costs of questionable device utility, 
data-breach threats, and discriminatory applications of generated data 
been fully considered?  
This paper evaluates the societal impact of wearables and how 
America’s limited regulatory landscape is ill-equipped to effectively re-
spond to various legal issues relating to broad generation and dissem-
ination of personal health data.1 Part II of this paper provides a foun-
dational background that explains emerging wearable technology and 
outlines the accompanying benefits and drawbacks of the devices. Part 
III examines the current landscape of regulation designed to protect 
personal health data and explores the sufficiency of such as it relates to 
wearables. Part IV suggests that, rather than adopting comprehensive 
 
 1. Several articles similarly explore the current regulatory challenges associated with 
wearables, including Alexandra Troiano, Note, Wearables and Personal Health Data: Putting a 
Premium on Your Privacy, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1715 (2017). Both the Troiano article and this 
paper consider the benefits and drawbacks of wearables along with the current regulatory land-
scape, and subsequently propose recommended solutions to the identified challenges. This paper, 
however, expands the scope of Troiano in at least three important ways: first, by highlighting the 
questionable device utility of wearables—a crucial element of the debate; second, by identifying 
and emphasizing that wearable data can potentially be used for discriminatory purposes—another 
relevant point for consideration; and, third, by proposing an alternative solution for how best to 
protect personal health data in the United States—that is, to implement limited regulation that 
provides users with clear notice and consent. 
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regulation like the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) of 
the European Union, the United States should pursue solutions that 
promote commercial innovation, which is essential to reducing the 
high costs of health care. More specifically, the government should 
consider implementing only limited regulation, modeled after certain 
provisions of the GDPR, that provides users with clear notice and con-
sent regarding the privacy policies of associated data generating de-
vices and applications. Part V concludes. 
ffK==tb^o^_ib=absf`b=qb`eklildv=
Wearable technology refers to any electronic device with sensors, 
typically worn on the body, that is used to collect and deliver infor-
mation about their surroundings—traditionally, health and fitness re-
lated activities.2 Though most commonly worn on the wrist,3 weara-
bles come in a variety of forms (e.g., watches, glasses, belts, shirts, 
shoes, jewelry, implants, etc.)4 and are often designed to remain on the 
body of a user at all times.5 As part of a larger category of products 
known as the “Internet of Things,”6 wearables are equipped with sen-
sors that measure and analyze7 a range of activity—and many de-




 2. Sandra Chefitz, June Quah & Adnan Haque, Stratifying Mortality Risk Using Physical 
Activity as Measured by Wearable Sensors, 1 MUNICH RE 8, 1 (2018), https://www.munichre.c 
om/site/marclife-mobile/get/documents_E-889788279/marclife/assset.marclife/Documents/Pu 
blications/Stratifying_Risk_Using_Wearable_Data.pdf. 
 3. Matthew R. Langley, Note, Hide Your Health: Addressing the New Privacy Problem 
of Consumer Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1642 (2015). 
 4. Id. at 1643; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1716. 
 5. Langley, supra note 3, at 1643–44. 
 6. A “thing” is any object with embedded electronics that can collect and subsequently 
transfer data over a network without human interaction. Watson Internet of Things: What is the 
IoT?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/internet-of-things/learn/what-is-iot/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2018). 
 7. Yiftah Ben Aharon, Small Wearable Devices May Lead to Big Health Care Savings, 
STAT (June 7, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/07/wearable-devices-health-care-sav-
ings/. 
 8. Internet of Things, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things 
(last updated Nov. 8, 2018). 
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A.  Market Usage and Adoption 
Though wearables were originally designed to support medical 
needs, the market experienced an increase in the past decade in devices 
designed to assist recreational users in tracking health and fitness lev-
els.9 Thus, wearables include sensors that monitor and record not only 
sensitive patient health information (e.g., blood pressure, respiratory 
rate, oxygen saturation, temperature, etc.),10 but also daily recreational 
physical activity11 (e.g., steps taken, distance traveled, calories burned, 
sleep patterns, heart rate, etc.).12 Perhaps the most well-known recre-
ational wearables are fitness activity bands and smart watches (e.g., Fit-
bit, Apple Watch, Garmin, Nike Fuelband, etc.). Across both applica-
tions, wearables are revolutionizing health care by generating 
accessible real-time personal health information. 
Today, the market is flooded with both medical and recreational 
wearables13 and trends suggest their popularity is likely to continue. 
Nearly one-in-five Americans own a wearable14 and experts predict the 
devices will eventually become “as ubiquitous as cell phones.”15 Global 
revenue from wearables is projected to grow at a compound average 
growth rate16 of 29%17 to reach more than $6.3 billion by 2020—a dra-
matic increase from the $218 million in 2015.18 Wearables are also at-
tracting a significant level of interest from investors, who invested 
 
 9. Langley, supra note 3, at 1644; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1716. 
 10. Grant Arnow, Apple Watch-ing You: Why Wearable Technology Should Be Feder-
ally Regulated, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 607, 608 (2016); see also Langley, supra note 3, at 1644. 
 11. Langley, supra note 3, at 1643–44. 
 12. Aharon, supra note 7. 
 13. Janice Phaik Lin Goh, Privacy, Security, and Wearable Technology, LANDSLIDE, 
Nov./Dec. 2015, at 30. 
 14. Langley, supra note 3, at 1645. 
 15. Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness De-
vice, 72 J. MO. B. 76, 77 (2016). 
 16. A compound average growth rate is the mean annual growth rate of an investment 
over a specified period longer than one year. Compound Annual Growth Rate – CAGR, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 17. Global Wearable Technology Market Growth, Analysis, Size and Forecast 2030 by 
Applications in Healthcare, Fitness and Communication Industry, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:00 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-capital/article?id=20114. 
 18. Vera Gruessner, Wearable Devices Market Expected to Reach $6.3 Billion by 2020, 
MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://mhealthintelligence.com/news/wearable-de-
vices-market-expected-to-reach-6.3-billion-by-2020; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1716. 
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nearly $41 million in development and marketing of the devices be-
tween 2008 and 2014.19 These projections suggest wearables will be-
come and remain a popular consumer product in society and command 
substantial attention from both a commercial and legal standpoint. 
B.  The Benefits of Wearables 
Wearables and associated health data transferred to companion ap-
plications present a variety of social opportunities and benefits. Per-
haps most importantly, wearables have the potential to reduce health 
care costs by improving individual well-being and generating associ-
ated data analytics that medical and non-medical third-parties can lev-
erage for a variety of commercial purposes. A significant portion of the 
country’s rising health care cost is driven by unhealthy behaviors (e.g., 
poor diet, little exercise, stress, excessive alcohol consumption, smok-
ing, etc.), many of which frequently lead to more serious and chronic 
diseases (e.g., obesity, diabetes, heart disease, etc.).20 These conditions 
collectively account for nearly 86% of all health care expenses.21 To 
combat such trends, policymakers are attempting to improve both the 
health of populations and experience of care, while simultaneously re-
ducing the per capita cost.22 Proactively engaging patients in their own 
health—ideally, before unhealthy behaviors lead to more chronic dis-
eases—is central to achieving these objectives,23 and wearables may be 
an effective tool in that effort. 
Individual well-being could be improved using wearables since 
their convenience and diagnostic capabilities may enable users to ef-
fectively monitor health and identify potential medical problems at an 
earlier stage.24 Since personal health data is constantly being collected 
from wearables and processed via companion applications, users can 
immediately access data compilations and analyses in one place25 with 
 
 19. Matt Witheiler, The Investments in a Wearables Future, TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 20, 
2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/09/20/the-wearable-future/. 
 20. Parmy Olson, Wearable Tech Is Plugging into Health Insurance, FORBES (June 19, 
2014, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/06/19/wearable-tech-health-
insurance/#621a6e4618bd. 
 21. Aharon, supra note 7. 
 22. Nicolas P. Terry, Will the Internet of Things Transform Healthcare?, 19 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 327, 329 (2016). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Goh, supra note 13, at 32. 
 25. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1716. 
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virtually no effort.26 This detailed stream of personal health infor-
mation may—when regularly reviewed—promote healthier behavior 
among users27 because it reminds users of the long-term impact of poor 
lifestyle choices.28 For example, recreational wearables often help 
highlight sedentary habits by reminding users to stand after extended 
periods of sitting29 or to walk a certain number of steps each day. Ac-
cess to these and other previously unmeasurable metrics30 makes it eas-
ier for users to consciously engage with their health, effectively moving 
society closer toward the ultimate objective of reducing health 
care costs.31 
Medical wearables may also facilitate an increased interest in pre-
ventative care32 among health care providers, rather than traditional 
reactive treatments of more serious later-stage conditions.33 Common 
methods of such care—which arguably reduce the overall cost of treat-
ment in the long-run—include self-examinations, regular health 
check-ups, disease screenings, maintaining updated immunizations, 
etc.34 Similar to these strategies, wearables may become another chan-
nel of preventative care since certain data generated—if disclosed and 
monitored—could alert health care providers of problems requiring 
more immediate attention35 or inform providers more holistically of a 
patient’s lifestyle and health profile. For example, wearables could 
make it easier for users and health care providers to detect and treat 
influenza.36 Symptoms for the disease, whether mild or severe, often 
 
 26. Arnow, supra note 10, at 608. 
 27. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1716. 
 28. Arnow, supra note 10, at 610. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 607–08. 
 31. According to a survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers, nearly 56% of re-
spondents believed that wearables could extend their life expectancy by ten years while 46% 
thought wearables could decrease obesity by helping consumers more effectively monitor nutri-
tion and exercise. Healthy Wearables: Early Days, 1 PWC 11, 1 (2014), http://www.healthworks-
collective.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/pwc-hri-wearable-devices.pdf. 
 32. Though its effectiveness is still a topic of debate, preventative care emphasizes disease 
prevention through early identification and proactive treatment of potential health problems. 
Preventative Healthcare, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preventive_healthcare (last 
updated Oct. 8, 2018). 
 33. Goh, supra note 13, at 32. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Aharon, supra note 7. 
 36. Andrew Boyd, Could Fitbit Data Be Used to Deny Health Coverage, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 
17, 2017, 1:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-02-17/could-
fitbit-data-be-used-to-deny-health-insurance-coverage. 
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are difficult to recognize, and certain treatments are most effective 
only if administered within twenty-four hours of their onset.37 Awear-
able could identify the presence of this condition almost immediately 
if it measured “a sudden decrease in the number of steps the person 
takes per day” along with “an elevated resting heart rate.”38 Also, data 
analytics collected from wearables over an extended period could assist 
health care providers in more accurately diagnosing problems and pre-
scribing treatments for patients.39 The data could even be synced with 
electronic health records to enable greater patient accountabil-
ity, which could potentially lead to reduced patient readmis-
sion costs.40 Such readmissions are not only expensive, but also avoid-
able if the hospital improves its discharge process to facilitate 
enhanced patient self-management.41 
Since comprehensive preventative care is often too expensive for 
health systems and patients,42 certain features of wearables could serve 
as an ancillary form of care. A need for medical attention, for example, 
could be triggered if a wearable detected any life threatening patterns 
(e.g., a heart attack or stroke) of its user.43 While the cost of an ap-
pointment with a health care provider varies depending on services 
rendered and payment method,44 the average purchase price of a wear-
able is only about $96.0345 with limited maintenance and operating 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Research by Accenture suggests that 63% of patients are open to sharing wearable data 
with their health plans and 90% are willing to share that data with medical providers. Bruce 
Japsen, How Insurers and Wearables Will Change Healthcare, MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 13, 2016, 
2:02 PM),  https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/03/13/how-insurers-and-wearables-
will-change-healthcare.aspx. 
 40. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1720. A readmission is “an inpatient stay that begins within 
30 days of the discharge date of an index admission and can be to the same or a different hospi-
tal” and “may or may not be related to the care received at the index admission.” Gregory John-
son, The Cost of a Hospital Readmission, LINKEDIN (Jan. 16, 2017) (citation omitted), https:// 
www.speechmed.com/cost-hospital-readmission/. A recent study estimated the following aver-
age costs of a readmission for patients receiving: Medicare ($13,800), Medicaid ($12,300), unin-
sured persons ($10,100), and private insurer ($14,200). Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Preventative Healthcare, supra note 32. 
 43. Timothy L. Fort et. al., The Angel on Your Shoulder: Prompting Employees to Do 
the Right Thing Through the Use of Wearables, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 139, 149 
(2016). 
 44. In 2011, the average cost of a fifteen minute visit with a doctor was $104. Doctor Visit 
Costs, DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/medical/doctor-visit-costs/ (last updated May 24, 
2018). 
 45. The average purchase price of “health and fitness trackers” was estimated by Statista 
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costs thereafter—assuming the user has access to a smartphone or 
computer to view the data compiled on a companion application.46 If 
wearables prove to be an adequate supplement to preventative care, the 
devices could provide substantial savings for individuals looking to re-
duce their reliance upon expensive health care providers. 
In addition to preventative care, precision medicine47 provides cus-
tomized medical treatment to patients based on individual character-
istics. Under this approach, providers offer optimal patient treatments 
based on an individual’s genetics, environment, and lifestyle.48 Weara-
bles could help in this effort since more comprehensive patient moni-
toring would likely create more complete datasets to aid in identifying 
useful subgroups for patient profiling.49 When detailed genetic infor-
mation is combined with phenotypic data generated by wearables, pro-
viders are better equipped to “identify the right patients to receive the 
right therapy at the right time.”50 Thus, wearables coupled with pre-
ventative care and precision medicine not only have the potential to 
improve individual well-being, but also to “revolutionize disease treat-
ment.”51 As such, it is not surprising that wearables are being “touted 
as the revolution in health care.”52 
If disclosed, data generated by wearables could also be leveraged 
by non-medical third-parties—including employers-at-large, insur-
ance providers, marketers, and even lawyers—in ways that may also 
reduce health care costs. Categorially speaking, each of these entities 
 
in 2014 to be £73, which converts to approximately $96.03 USD. Average Price of Wearable 
Technology Products in the United Kingdom (UK) Between January and September 2014 (in 
GBP), STATISTA,  https://www.statista.com/statistics/373766/wearbles-technology-average-pro 
duct-price-uk-united-kingdom/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 46. In 2017, smartphone penetration in the U.S. reached 69.3%. Top 50 Countries/Mar-
kets by Smartphone Users and Penetration, NEWZOO (Sept. 2018), https://newzoo.com/in-
sights/rankings/top-50-countries-by-smartphone-penetration-and-users/. 
 47. Precision medicine is “an emerging approach for disease treatment and prevention 
that takes into account the individual variability in genes, environment, and lifestyle for each 
person.” What Is Precision Medicine?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/precisionmedicine/definition. 
 48. Arnow, supra note 10, at 612-13. 
 49. David Shaywitz, Wearables as Tools for Precision Medicine: Promise in Search of Ev-
idence,  FORBES  (Feb.  7,  2015,  8:43  PM),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidshaywitz/2015/ 
02/07/wearables-as-tools-for-precision-medicine-a-promise-in-search-of-evidence/#15d2ef104 
77a. 
 50. Id. 
 51. “Precision medicine promises to improve health and revolutionize disease treatment 
by accelerating biomedical discoveries, providing clinicians with new tools, knowledge, and ther-
apies to select effective treatments for individual patients.” Arnow, supra note 10, at 612–13. 
 52. Goh, supra note 13, at 32. 
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is already harnessing wearable data to incentivize desired behavior and 
enhance market efficiencies. A popular practice among employers, for 
example, is the implementation of corporate health and wellness pro-
grams that invite employees to track their health habits using weara-
bles.53 Today, nearly 90% of companies in the United States offer 
some form of corporate wellness program.54 Most of these aim to im-
prove employee health and maximize workplace productivity while 
minimizing costly medical and insurance expenses.55 Many employers 
have taken these programs a step further by partnering with insurance 
providers willing to grant employees discounts for participation in 
their health-tracking programs.56 Under the Affordable Care Act, em-
ployers may offer wellness incentives (e.g., gift cards, rate discounts, 
etc.) to employees—paid for by the insurance providers—as long as 
employees use a wearable that records their daily activity.57 UnitedH-
ealthcare, for example, has offered participating employees up to $4.00 
per day for meeting certain daily walking goals.58 
Even without an employer wellness program, insurance providers 
recognize the value of wearables and have found ways to integrate 
them into individual policyholder plans.59 Data generated by weara-
 
 53. Scott Thiel & Nicolas Boyle, Wearables at Work: Data Privacy and Employment Law 
Implications, DLA PIPER (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publica-
tions/2016/04/wearables-at-work/. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. For example, Tokyo Electron, a Japanese semiconductor manufacturer, estimated 
it would pay $3200 per employee annually if the company had not implemented a wellness pro-
gram using Fitbits. Within eight years of implementing the program, Tokyo Electron found that 
the number of annual claims by employees was effectively reduced 6%—a claim is a request for 
payment that an individual (or that individual’s health care provider) submits to their health in-
surance provider when health services provided fall within coverage of the insurance policy of the 
individual. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1721–23; see also Olson, supra note 20. 
 56. Lindsey Patterson, 6 Insurance Companies Investing in Wearable Technology, 
TECHZONE 360 (June 27, 2016), http://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/20160
6/27/422510-6-insurance-companies-investing-wearable-technology.htm#. 
 57. Between 60-85% of employees are willing to share their health information with em-
ployers to receive discounts on their premiums. Christina Farr, Weighing Privacy Vs. Rewards 
of Letting Insurers Track Your Fitness, NPR (Apr. 9, 2015, 7:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/alltechconsidered/2015/04/09/398416513/weighing-privacy-vs-rewards-of-letting-insur-
ers-track-your-fitness. 
 58. Aharon, supra note 7. 
 59. A global survey by Accenture found that 63% of insurance executives believe wearables 
will be broadly adopted by the industry within the next two years with nearly a third already using 
the devices to engage customers, employers, and partners. Denise Johnson, How Wearable De-
vices Could Disrupt the Insurance Industry, INSURANCE JOURNAL (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/05/06/367014.htm. 
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bles, for example, can help providers conduct more accurate evalua-
tions of potential policyholders and simultaneously promote healthier 
behaviors among current ones.60 Traditionally, insurance providers 
base policy underwriting61 on a limited set of available variables (e.g., 
age, body mass index, etc.) with rates calculated through annual life-
style risk assessments (e.g., frequent skydiving would likely equate to a 
higher insurance premium).62 Wearables, however, present an unprec-
edented opportunity for carriers to underwrite based on the daily ac-
tivity of policyholders for more accurate behavioral-based rates.63 In 
other words, policyholders who exhibit a healthy lifestyle would be re-
warded with a lower premium—much in the same way embedded de-
vices in vehicles are being used to reward policyholders for safe driving 
in the automobile insurance industry.64 On the other hand, policyhold-
ers with poor health habits (or those who simply fail to provide their 
personal data) could be assessed higher premiums as they would pre-
sent a greater financial risk to the insurance provider.65 Experts predict 
that insurers will soon begin leveraging wearables to calculate premi-
ums on a more real-time basis—that is, replacing stagnant annual in-
surance rates under the current model with daily insurance rates based 
on individual actions.66 Proponents of these underwriting changes sug-
gest insurance providers will reduce health care costs as policyholders 
become more accountable for unhealthy behaviors and are incentiv-
ized to make appropriate lifestyle changes.67 
 
 60. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1723; see also Lucas Mearian, Insurance Company Now 
Offers Discounts—If You Let It Track Your Fitbit, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 17, 2015, 12:34 
PM),  https://www.computerworld.com/article/2911594/insurance-company-now-offers-discou 
nts-if-you-let-it-track-your-fitbit.html. 
 61. “Underwriting is the process of evaluating the risk of insuring a home, car, driver or 
individuals, such as in the case of life insurance, to determine if it’s profitable for the insurance 
company to take the chance. After determining the risk, the underwriter sets a price and estab-
lishes the insurance premium that will be charged in exchange for taking on that risk.” Mila 
Araujo, What is Insurance Underwriting, BALANCE (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.the-
balance.com/what-is-insurance-underwriting-2645778. 
 62. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1723; see also Finding Insurance Insider Information: How 
Insurance Companies Measure Risk, INSURANCE COMPANIES.COM, http://www.insurancecom-
panies.com/insider-information-how-insurance-companies-measure-risk/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2018). 
 63. Jo Best, Yes, Insurers Want Your Health Data - but Not for the Reason You Think, 
ZDNET (Nov. 3, 2015, 10:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/yes-insurers-want-your-
health-data-but-not-for-the-reason-you-think/. 
 64. Patterson, supra note 56. 
 65. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1723. 
 66. Olson, supra note 20. 
 67. Id. 
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Data generated by wearables is also being leveraged by marketing 
professionals and lawyers for industry specific purposes. Marketers use 
data to better understand and cater to consumer preferences. With a 
more holistic view of consumers, these professionals can develop 
highly personalized experiences68 and provide more targeted product 
offerings.69 A clothing company, for example, could promote tighter 
fitting clothing to a user whose wearable reported significant weight 
loss.70 Similarly, a mattress company could advertise the benefits of a 
new mattress to a user whose wearable registered poor sleep.71 These 
and other strategies could enhance consumer marketplace efficiencies. 
Wearable data is also becoming increasingly valuable to lawyers as a 
form of evidence and discovery. Although the rules of admissibility of 
such data remain in question, wearable data has already been accepted 
by some courts.72 In a world where data is like currency, the benefits 
and opportunities associated with wearables and their accompanying 
data are almost endless. By improving the personal health awareness 
of users and generating valuable analytics for medical and non-medical 
third-parties, wearables could be a driving force in reducing the cost 
of health care. 
C.  The Drawbacks of Wearables 
Despite the foregoing potential benefits, wearables do not come 
without a cost and are accompanied by several significant drawbacks. 
Some of the most concerning challenges include questionable device 
utility, data breach threats, and potential discriminatory applications 
of generated data. Since personal health information is perhaps the 
 
 68. Experts predict that soon we will see fabrics that can react to electric charge to change 
color, enabling users to control light patterns to match other elements in their outfit or colors in 
the surrounding environment. Zac Pinkham, How Will Wearables Influence Mobile Advertis-
ing, MARKETINGTECH (July 17, 2015), https://www.marketingtechnews.net/news/2015/jul/17
/how-will-wearables-influence-mobile-advertising/. 
 69. Langley, supra note 3, at 1646. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. In Canada, a plaintiff used her wearable data (i.e., a detailed record of gym visits before 
and after the accident) to prove a decline in physical activity after sustaining an injury in a car 
accident, which allowed her to prevail on her claims. Angela Foster, Legal Implications of Data 
from Wearable Devices, ABA (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/litiga-
tion-news/technology/legal-implications-of-data-from-wearable-devices.html. 
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most sensitive data type in existence,73 users and third-parties collect-
ing, analyzing, and publishing wearable data should carefully consider 
these challenges when leveraging a device or its associated data. 
Wearables have been fundamentally criticized for a lack of utility 
primarily due to ineffectiveness and inconsistency. Primarily, these 
criticisms derive from alleged unreliability of generated data and a lack 
of evidence that wearable usage truly alters behavior for the better. A 
growing body of research suggests that existing wearable models are 
not especially effective at collecting accurate data.74 Such inconsisten-
cies become especially problematic when employers and insurance 
providers rely upon device data to calculate rewards and insurance pre-
miums. Recent comparisons, for example, between different wearables 
tracking identical user activity revealed substantial variations75 in data 
accuracy—with error margins upwards of 25%.76 If perfect device ac-
curacy is presumed to be unlikely, employers and insurance providers 
would face the daunting task of determining what the acceptable error 
margin should be for devices incorporated into their programs. Addi-
tional concerns surround potential user ability to trick the device into 
tracking false information or to manipulate the collected data thereaf-
ter. Is there any mechanism in place, for example, to prevent a user 
from paying the local paperboy to wear their device around the neigh-
borhood each morning to earn extra miles? Likewise, users may fre-
quently fail to charge, sync, or wear their devices, effectively prevent-
ing data from being accurately collected at crucial moments in time.77 
If attractive enough incentives are offered to users, employers and in-
surance providers should reasonably expect participants in their pro-
grams to find fraudulent avenues for achieving the preferred standards. 
Even if wearables could generate accurate data, most device man-
ufacturers are still unable to provide any empirical evidence that their 
 
 73. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1724. 
 74. Terry, supra note 22, at 335. 
 75. According to Dr. Douglas Ross, an Intermountain Healthcare pulmonologist, weara-
bles “often overestimate sleep time and cannot accurately determine sleep quality.” Aley Davis, 
Smartwatch Helps Mom of Five Track Her Sleep, but Is the Device Helpful?, KSL.COM  (May 
3, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www.ksl.com/?sid=46312968&nid=148&title=smartwatch-helps-
mom-of-five-track-her-sleep-but-is-the-device-helpful. 
 76. Jung-Min Lee, Youngwon Kim & Gregory J. Welk, Validity of Consumer-Based 
Physical Activity Monitors, 46 J.MED. & SCI. IN SPORTS & EXERCISE 1840, 1840 (2014); see also 
Meredith A. Case, Holland A Burwick, Kevin G. Volpp & Mitesh S. Patel, Accuracy of 
Smartphone Applications and Wearable Devices for Tracking Physical Activity Data, 313 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 625, 625–26 (2015). 
 77. Fort, supra note 43, at 153–54. 
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products are truly effective in changing behavior. Though only a lim-
ited amount of research exists regarding wearable effectiveness,78 most 
reports suggest wearables do little to incentivize behavioral change 
among users.79 In a recent year-long study, researchers measured the 
health and physical activity of 800 individuals with full-time jobs—
some wore a Fitbit and were paid a small amount of money to exercise, 
while others were instructed not to wear a Fitbit.80 During the last six 
months of the study, all monetary incentives were dropped and partic-
ipants could choose whether to continue wearing their device.81 While 
monetary incentives seemed to work,82 improvements ceased as soon 
as the rewards were eliminated.83 No group successfully improved their 
health outcomes measured by the researchers for either six or twelve 
months.84 The lead researcher ultimately concluded that wearables 
“should not be relied upon as tools for weight management in place of 
effective behavioral counseling for physical activity and diet.”85 In 
other words, simply giving an individual a wearable that tracks their 
health behaviors against what they should be doing is not particularly 
motivating.86 Though some suggest any increase in physical activity is 
beneficial, the author of the study argues that minor increases are not 
enough to produce meaningful change.87 As it turns out, motivating 
individuals to adopt healthy habits is extremely difficult to do88—even 
if you pay them to do it—and wearables may not be enough “to moti-
vate the people who need to be motivated the most.”89 
 
 
 78. Bryan Bumgardner, Do Fitness Wearables Live Up to Their Promise?, CBS NEWS 
(June 24, 2015, 10:27 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/do-fitness-wearables-live-up-to-
their-promise/. 
 79. Mandy Oaklander, There’s Even More Evidence That Fitness Trackers Don’t Work, 
TIME (Oct. 4, 2016), http://time.com/4517033/fitness-tracker-fitbit-zip-exercise/. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Those rewarded with cash performed an additional thirteen minutes of moderate-to-
vigorous physical activity each week, effectively adding 570 steps to their daily counts. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Activity Trackers Are Ineffective at Sustaining Weight Loss, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 
20, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160920131932.htm. 
 86. Oaklander, supra note 79. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Bumgardner, supra note 78. 
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 Similarly, additional research suggests that a principal reason  be-
hind the lack of motivation to adopt health habits is the failure of wear-
ables to drive long-term interest and engagement among users. One 
survey found that a third of users stopped using their devices within six 
months of receiving them and nearly half stopped within a year.90 A 
surprisingly high percentage of users stopped using their devices be-
cause they experienced one or more fatal user experience flaws91 (e.g., 
easily lost or broken, too difficult to sync with otherdevices, poor bat-
tery life, displeasing aesthetics, discomfort to the user, etc.).92 Others 
may be discouraged altogether from using wearables by health profes-
sionals if the devices cause users too much stress.93 Moreover, weara-
bles fail to track a significant component of personal health—that is, 
food consumed by a user. Regardless of an individual’s level of physical 
activity, their health is still largely dependent upon “what food [they] 
put into [their] bod[ies].”94 Though everyone seems to be looking for 
an easy fix to poor health habits and high health care costs, the met-
rics measured by wearables alone are not what will actually make indi-
viduals healthy.95 Thus, device manufacturers hoping to make a mean-
ingful impact should continue exploring alternative ways to 










 90. Id.; see also Teena Maddox, Wearables Have a Dirty Little Secret: 50% of Users Lose 
Interest, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:29 PM), https://www.techrepublic.com/arti-
cle/wearables-have-a-dirty-little-secret-most-people-lose-interest/. 
 91. Dan Ledger & Daniel McCaffrey, Inside Wearables: How the Science of Human Be-
havior Change Offers the Secret to Long-Term Engagement, MEDIUM (Jan. 2014), 
https://blog.endeavour.partners/inside-wearable-how-the-science-of-human-behavior-change-
offers-the-secret-to-long-term-engagement-a15b3c7d4cf3. 
 92. Maddox, supra note 90. 
 93. According to Dr. Douglas Ross, an Intermountain Healthcare pulmonologist, if wear-
ables cause stress they are probably not worth it: “[t]he more they worry about their sleep and 
their insomnia, the more they stress . . . [a]nd the more they worry, the less sleep comes.” Davis, 
supra note 75. 
 94. Bumgardner, supra note 78. 
 95. Id. 
(7) NASH.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:46 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law=  [Vol. 33 
210 
A second alarming challenge associated with wearables is data 
breach, which may be partially due to information asymmetries be-
tween users and device manufacturers.96 The risk of data breach97 is 
especially concerning given the sensitive nature of personal health in-
formation and relatively unsound practices of wearable data collection 
and dissemination. Data generated by wearables is considered by many 
to be even more sensitive and vulnerable than financial data.98 Certain 
procedures and diagnoses, for example, often become a permanent part 
of a patient’s medical history.99 If accessed even once by a hacker,100 
health information can be mishandled and used against an individual 
forever (e.g., sold to companies that could build user profiles without 
consumer consent, collected by stalking applications, etc.).101 Equally 
concerning is the unsound collection and dissemination of wearable 
data, which users often have little control over due to information 
asymmetries. Most users, for example, expect wearables to collect data 
on steps taken and sleeping patterns, but are often unaware that devices 
also collect precise geolocation data—which could reveal highly per-
sonal information (e.g., an individual’s visit to an AIDS clinic or place 
of worship).102 Similarly, wearables often continue collecting data, un-
beknownst to users, even after the battery of the device dies or a user 
 
 96. Advocates for greater user protection argue that most people care about data privacy, 
but simply do not know how to use the Internet and other related technologies in ways that 
simultaneously protect their data (e.g., users are uncertain as to how their data is being used and 
transmitted since the backend functionality of wearables is often hidden). Kellogg, supra note 15, 
at 79–80. Yet, those purchasing wearables seem to consistently place a higher value on device 
convenience and ease of use rather than added security features that would undoubtedly increase 
purchase price. Sharon D. Nelson, Advances Will Keep Transforming Our Lives—and Threaten 
Privacy, Security, 40 MONT. L. 18, 22 (2015). 
 97. The Identify Theft Research Center predicted that the number of data breaches in the 
United States would reach nearly 1500 in 2017, a 37% increase from the prior year. Nick Ismail, 
Should the US Adopt GDPR?, INFO. AGE (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.information-age.com/us-
adopt-gdpr-123469401/. Yet, data privacy remains relatively unregulated across the nation. Id. 
 98. According to Michelle De Mooy, Deputy Director of the Consumer Privacy Project 
at the Center for Democracy & Technology, personal health information generated by wearables 
is even more vulnerable than financial data “because you can’t replace it like you can a credit 
card.” Kellogg, supra note 15, at 76. 
 99. Id. 
 100. “According to a recent YouGov survey, 28% of U.S. adults admit to using the same 
password for all or most of their online logins, which is even more astonishing considering that 
35% of the respondents had one of their accounts hacked at least once and 22% have fallen victim 
to online identity theft.” Felix Richter, Young Americans are Careless With Their Online Pass-
words, STATISTA (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.statista.com/chart/11525/americans-using-the-
same-online-password/. 
 101. Goh, supra note 13, at 31. 
 102. Id. 
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closes a companion application.103 This collected data is frequently 
“stored within vulnerable network systems, the security of which is 
largely, if not entirely, unregulated.”104 In other words, users are gen-
erating a tremendous amount of data, but wearable companies do not 
“tak[e] some of the necessary precautions that more established com-
panies would take in terms of data privacy and security.”105 Multiple 
device and platform integration only heightens the risk of data breach 
since “the least secure device becomes the security level for all [the 
devices].”106 Even if companies were to incorporate additional security 
features, “no data is immune from a breach”107 and its permanent de-
letion is often “difficult (if not impossible)” to remedy.108 Given these 
realities, it is not surprising that Americans often feel they have little 
control over the information collected about them and ignorantly pre-
sume “their data will in fact remain private and secure.”109 
Perhaps most disheartening, is that wearables could threaten indi-
vidual privacy and lead to potential discriminatory applications of the 
generated data. At first glance, wearables seem like an optimal solution 
for reducing health care costs since they are positioned to incentivize 
people to develop healthier lifestyles. An incentive structure built 
around individual habits, however, has potential to unfairly advantage 
and disadvantage certain subsets of the population. Debate exists, for 
example, over whether wearables truly serve the population at large or 
if they simply cater to the already healthy and wealthy.110 A recent re-
port indicated that nearly 41% of fitness tracker owners earned an av-
erage annual income of more than $100 thousand.111 Thus, behavioral 
 
 103. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1724–25. 
 104. Arnow, supra note 10, at 615. 
 105. Kellogg, supra note 15, at 77. 
 106. Id. at 78. 
 107. Farr, supra note 57 (according to Christine Sublett, a Silicon Valley-based security 
expert). 
 108. Arnow, supra note 10, at 613. 
 109. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and Sur-
veillance, PEW RES. CENTER (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/ameri-
cans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/. 
 110. Lukasz Piwek, David A. Ellis, Sally Andrews & Adam Joinson, The Rise of Consumer 
Health Wearables: Promises and Barriers, PLOS MED. (2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosme 
dicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001953. 
 111. The federal poverty level in 2017 was $12,060 for households with one person living 
within the forty-eight Border States and Washington, D.C. Lindsay Wissman, 2017 Federal Pov-
erty Level Guidelines, PEOPLEKEEP (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/2017-
federal-poverty-level-guidelines. 
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economists argue that adoption of the devices may implicitly bias low-
income individuals.112 Those working several part-time jobs, for exam-
ple, may be so limited financially that they are unable to purchase and 
prepare healthy foods, access adequate exercise facilities, or even set 
aside time for any exercise at all.113 Overtime, it is reasonable to expect 
that the personal health profiles—which would include historical and 
real-time wearable data—of these low-income individuals would look 
drastically different from those living in greater abundance.114 In turn, 
these discrepancies could compel low-income individuals to pay 
higher premiums.115 Such a discrepancy between income classes is 
troubling when considering how profiles may affect individual access 
or cost to obtain insurance coverage. 
Insurance providers with access to voluntarily disclosed personal 
health profiles could also create more accurate and customized risk-
based policies for their insured. Today, such data is rarely used at the 
individual level to calculate potential risk—though, personalized be-
havioral-based coverage assessments are certainly within the realm of 
possibility with wearables. Instead, many insurance carriers estimate 
risk levels through sophisticated models that combine vast non-per-
sonal data to predict individual risk (e.g., assuming a male between 
thirty and forty years old is likely low risk based on previously aggre-
gated data on men that age).116 The voluntarily shared wearable data 
from individuals to employers and insurance providers is precise 
enough to ultimately fuel large-scale algorithmic models. While most 
classify the exchange as a reward, privacy experts fear it is “ultimately 
a stick” disguised as a carrot.117 In other words, experts foresee carriers 
aggregating such voluntarily disclosed wearable data—most, if not all, 
of which was acquired lawfully through optional participation incen-
tive programs—to develop large datasets that could be used to identify 
trends and eventually deny coverage to individuals based on their al-
gorithmically estimated health risks.118 Even those unwilling to volun-
tarily disclose their wearable data could then be discriminated against 
 
 112. Farr, supra note 57. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Olson, supra note 20. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Alan Martin, Step and Save: The Truth About Wearables and Health Insurance, 
WEARABLE (May 21, 2015), https://www.wareable.com/wearable-tech/step-and-save-the-risks-
of-using-fitness-tracker-to-save-on-your-insurance-premium-1163. 
 117. Farr, supra note 57. 
 118. Boyd, supra note 36. 
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by insurers, who could apply the aggregated data of similarly situated 
persons to such individuals.119 Like a low credit score, unhealthy habits 
could place individuals a “blacklist”120 which could allow insurance 
providers to raise premiums for those unwilling or unable to get 
healthier. While this would certainly introduce a compelling incentive 
system, it is concerning to think of health insurance functioning like 
car insurance—where any health infraction (e.g., holiday feast, seden-
tary Netflix binge, etc.) could hurt your real-time health score.121 Gen-
erally, insurance companies are only allowed to increase the premiums 
of their insured by showing the individual exhibited “increased risk.”122 
If read too broadly, however, an increased risk could be almost any-
thing (e.g., walking through a dangerous area, cycling or skiing too 
fast, etc.) as the insurance industry moves closer toward its “data-
driven future.”123 Though we are likely years away from this dystopian 
nightmare, many believe society is on its way there.124 
Mandated use of wearables and/or disclosure of their resulting data 
would only worsen the consequences of discrimination. As history has 
shown, voluntary programs today—like disclosure of wearable data for 
rewards—could easily become mandatory in the future.125 Employers 
could force employees to use wearables and regularly report their re-
sults. Insurance providers could require prospective policyholders to 
 
 119. If an insurance provider, for example, aggregated enough information about people 
with asthma, they could likely detect an asthma patient “looking just at their data.” Id. 
 120. Farr, supra note 57. 
 121. Cindy Ng, What If Fitness Wearables Affected Our Health Insurance Rates, VARONIS 
(Mar. 12, 2015), https://blog.varonis.com/fitness-wearables-affected-health-insurance-rates/. 
 122. Ben Lovejoy, John Hancock Requires Vitality Program Membership; Sharing Fitness 
Data Earns Rewards, 9TO5MAC (Sept. 20, 2018), https://9to5mac.com/2018/09/20/john-han-
cock-life-insurance-apple-watch/. John Hancock—a prominent life insurance company—re-
cently announced that all new policyholders will be required to join its Vitality program, which 
requires the recording of fitness and health data using wearable devices. Id. The insurer will also 
be converting existing policies to its Vitality program at the start of next year. Id. Though the 
actual sharing of data with John Hancock continues to remain optional, such strategic underwrit-
ing is an example of the insurance industry’s shift toward more “interactive policies.” Id. 
 123. Conor Grant, 156-Year Old Insurer John Hancock Now Requires Customers to Use 
Health Wearables, HUSTLE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://thehustle.co/John-Hancock-Life-Insur-
ance-EKG-healthwearables/?utm_campaign=9%2F20%3A+danske+bank&utm_content=John-
Hancock-Life-Insurance-EKG-health-wearables&utm_medium=email&utm_source=daily. 
 124. Id.; Lovejoy, supra note 122. 
 125. Initially, “bring your own device” (“BYOD”) workplace initiatives were voluntary opt-
in programs, but Gartner estimated that nearly half of employers would mandate BYOD by 2017. 
Zack Whittaker, BYOD: From Optional to Mandatory by 2017, Says Gartner, ZDNET (May 2, 
2013, 10:54 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/byod-from-optional-to-mandatory-by-2017-
says-gartner/. 
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disclose wearable data in place of or in addition to a more traditional 
physical exam by a health care provider.126 Even if wearables were not 
required to be worn, mere ownership of a device or the apparent will-
ingness to share its data could be revealing enough for an entity seek-
ing to better understand an individual’s personal health.127 After all, 
those who own wearables are likely the sort of person an insurer may 
desire as a policyholder.128 
Based on the analysis above, the drawbacks of wearables currently 
seem to outweigh the benefits—thus, entities should be cautious in re-
lying upon wearable data for any meaningful insights. Similarly, poli-
cymakers should be thoughtful and avoid creating a system that co-
erces or even pressures individuals into using wearables to monitor 
their personal health.129 After all, the more society allows for constant 
tracking, the more difficult it is to prevent technology from “en-
croach[ing] on our lives.”130 Ultimately, the “bad use of data can be 
worse than no data at all”131 and the more data entities in power collect, 
the more it can be used against individuals for gain. 
fffK==bufpqfkd=obdri^qlov=i^kap`^mb=
Despite significant risk surrounding the data they generate, wear-
ables are not currently regulated directly by state or federal statute. 
Yet, wearables and their accompanying data find some protection—
despite their novelty—through a series of other existing legal entities 
and frameworks.132 Several prominent government agencies play a role 
in helping users protect wearable data from misappropriation and mis-
use, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”), the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”).133 A lack of specificity, uniformity, and breadth 
 
 126. Nobody Reads Privacy Policies – Here’s How to Fix That, CONVERSATION (Oct. 9, 
2017, 7:25 PM), http://theconversation.com/nobody-reads-privacy-policies-heres-how-to-fix-
that-81932 [hereinafter Nobody Reads Privacy Policies]. 
 127. Best, supra note 63. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Olson, supra note 20. 
 130. Jathan Sadowski, Why Does Privacy Matter? One Scholar’s Answer, ATLANTIC (Feb. 
26, 2013),  https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/why-does-privacy-matter-
one-scholars-answer/273521/. 
 131. Fort, supra note 43, at 168. 
 132. Id. at 1728. 
 133. Id. at 1732. 
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regarding legal rights protected by these regulatory authorities for 
wearables, however, often results in inadequate protection of device 
users’ interests. While the Fourth Amendment and legal precedent134 
grant individuals a reasonable expectation of privacy, those who will-
ingly expose their privacy to the public surrender this fundamental 
right.135 By opting to share their device data with external entities, 
wearable users often inadvertently renounce this reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Such disjointed regulatory authority and data privacy 
laws effectively grant companies in possession of wearable data to con-
trol how user data is used—subject only to their own convoluted       
privacy policies. 
A.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
The HHS, a primary agency of the federal government, aims to 
promote the health of Americans by providing health and human ser-
vices and fostering advances in medicine, public health, and social ser-
vices.136 This agency oversees perhaps the most prominent regulation 
regarding personal health information—the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”).137 Congressional enactment 
of HIPPA directed the HHS to promulgate regulations to protect both 
the privacy and security of personal health information.138 The HIPPA 
Privacy Rule established national standards for protecting certain types 
of health information.139 More specifically, the rule limits the use and 
disclosure of such information without patient authorization and 
grants various rights to patients about their respective health infor-
mation (e.g., right to obtain a copy of their health records and request 
 
 134. In Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court extended Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to include all areas where a person has “reasonable expectation[] of privacy,” yet clarified, 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 362 (1967). 
 135. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1741. 
 136. About HHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/about/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
        137. HIPPA  Enforcement,  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,  https://www.hhs. 
gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
 2018). 
 138. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2018). 
 139. Id. 
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corrections).140 The HIPPA Security Rule effectively operationalized 
these standards141 by requiring “covered entities”142 to safeguard any 
form (i.e., oral, paper, or electronic) of “individually identifiable health 
information”—which the Privacy Rule calls “protected health infor-
mation” (“PHI”)—that the entity holds or transmits.143 Under the stat-
ute, PHI includes any information related to an individual’s “past, pre-
sent or future physical or mental health or [sic] condition, the 
provision of health care to the individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of health care to the individual”—which of-
ten includes demographic information and unique identifiers like an 
individual’s “name, address, birth date, [and] Social Security Num-
ber.”144 In summary, HIPPA provides an efficient way for covered en-
tities to share PHI electronically in a way that curbs misuse of data and 
harmful disclosures. 
While HIPPA is a broadly applied statute, it is unclear whether 
wearable manufacturers and the data they collect are regulated by 
HIPPA. Since wearable manufacturers fall outside the traditional def-
inition of covered entities, they are not clearly subject to HIPPA stand-
ards.145 Similarly, data generated by wearables is not typically viewed 
or classified as PHI and, therefore, rarely treated as being governed by 
HIPPA.146 With that said, manufacturers may be subject to regulations 
if they voluntarily become HIPPA compliant or find themselves in sit-
uations involving a covered entity or in possession of PHI.147 If a device 
 
 140. Id.; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1733. 
 141. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, supra note 138. 
 142. Covered entities “can be institutions, organizations, or persons” and are defined by 
HIPPA as health plans (e.g., insurance providers), health care providers (e.g., doctors, clinicians), 
and health care clearinghouses and their business associates “who electronically transmit any 
health information in connection with transactions for which HHS has adopted standards.” To 
Whom Does the Privacy Rule Apply and Whom Will It Affect?, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH, https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_06.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 143. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, supra note 138. 
 144. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1732-33. “For example, a medical record, laboratory report, 
or hospital bill would be PHI because each document would contain a patient’s name and/or 
other identifying information associated with the health data content.” Guidance Regarding 
Methods for De-identification Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identifica 
tion/index.html#protected (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 145. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1732. 
 146. Adam H. Greene, When HIPPA Applies to Mobile Applications, MOBIHEALTHNE 
WS (June 16, 2011), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/11261/when-hipaa-applies-to-mobile-
applications. 
 147. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1734. 
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manufacturer, for example, were granted access to patient health in-
formation by a health care provider, the HIPPA standards would likely 
apply.148 Companion applications used by covered entities may also re-
ceive HIPPA protection.149 For example, a companion application to a 
wearable tracking an individual’s blood pressure for a health care pro-
vider would likely receive HIPPA protection since the collection of 
such involves both PHI (i.e., information about an individual’s physical 
health condition) and a covered entity (i.e., a health care provider).150 
In contrast, a companion application to a wearable collecting an indi-
vidual’s daily steps is unlikely to receive protection since no covered 
entity is involved.151 Despite these narrow areas of protection, wearable 
manufacturers are often unsure as to the breadth of such regulations 
and may be unwittingly under- or un-regulated by HIPPA given their 
lack of covered entity status. Although insurance providers are fre-
quently classified as covered entities, HIPPA fails to prevent those en-
tities from obtaining and aggregating wearable data.152 Thus, HIPPA 
may prove insufficient to effectively regulate legal challenges associ-
ated with wearables-derived personal health information. 
B.  The Food and Drug Administration 
Another federal agency responsible for promoting public health is 
the FDA. The FDA oversees “the safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices - including mobile medical apps” that arguably connect to 
wearables, yet it fails to regulate the proper breadth of wearables.153 
FDA guidelines154 issued in 2013, which outlined its oversight respon-
 
 148. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2015); see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1734. 
 149. Greene, supra note 146; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1733–34. 
 150. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1733. 
 151. To Whom Does the Privacy Rule Apply and Whom Will It Affect?, supra note 142; 
see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1733. 
 152. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1743. 
 153. Mobile  Medical  Applications,  U.S.  FOOD  &  DRUG  ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm255978.htm (last updated Oct. 8, 2018). 
 154. “The FDA issued the Mobile Medical Applications Guidance for Industry and Food 
and Drug Administration Staff on September 25, 2013, which explains the agency’s oversight of 
mobile medical apps as devices and our focus only on the apps that present a greater risk to pa-
tients if they don’t work as intended and on apps that cause smartphones or other mobile plat-
forms to impact the functionality or performance of traditional medical devices.” Id. 
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sibility, primarily emphasized its goal to protect individuals from ap-
plications that “don’t work as intended.”155 In other words, FDA reg-
ulations focus almost exclusively on regulating device effectiveness, ra-
ther than the privacy of their usage. Additional FDA guidelines156 
released last year reinforce that the agency will not vigorously regulate 
“low risk devices,” assuming such are “not harmful and generally en-
courage healthy habits.”157 Low risk devices may be subject to regula-
tion, however, if considered invasive, implanted, or reliant upon tech-
nology that threatens user safety.158 Since so few wearables pose such 
risks or meet such requirements, most wearables will likely be classified 
as low-risk devices and therefore intentionally left unregulated by the 
FDA.159 Notably, the FDA is also authorized to regulate medical “de-
vices”160 as defined by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
However, wearables are rarely intended to diagnose or cure medical 
conditions as the definition requires, and accordingly, are unlikely to 
be governed by such regulation by definition.161 Thus, FDA regulation 
also comes up short in regulating wearables. 
C.  The Federal Trade Commission 
The FTC is another federal agency involved in consumer protec-
tion and is charged with protecting consumers from unlawful trade 
practices.162 While the FTC may offer some regulatory protection for 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. One such guideline includes the General Wellness: Policy for Low Risk Devices. Gen-
eral Wellness: Policy for Low Risk Devices – Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin-
istration Staff, 1 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 10, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medi-
caldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm429674.pdf (last visited Nov. 
10, 2018) [hereinafter General Wellness]. 
 157. “Many devices with less-than-stellar track records for accuracy – such as calorie coun-
ters – would likely not be covered under the guidance.” Colin Lecher, The FDA Doesn’t Want 
to Regulate Wearables, and Device Makers Want to Keep It That Way, VERGE (June 24, 2015, 
2:07 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/6/24/8836049/fda-regulation-health-trackers-wear-
ables-fitbit. 
 158. General Wellness, supra note 156, at 5. 
 159. The FDA provides the following as an example of a device likely to be classified as 
low-risk: a mobile application that “solely monitors and records daily energy expenditure and 
cardiovascular workout activities. . . .” Id. at 6. 
 160. The Act defines “device” as instruments “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease 
or other conditions. . . .” Is The Product A Medical Device?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourD 
evice/ucm051512.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The FTC “works to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices” and 
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consumers purchasing and using wearables, the agency generally mon-
itors false or unsupported claims that wearables can diagnose or treat 
medical conditions.163 The FTC does not specifically concern itself 
with data breaches unless such arises from false or misleading claims 
associated with the sale of the devices, including those not classified as 
covered entities. The FTC has recently taken some action, however, 
to address concerns over a lack of privacy laws governing the devices. 
The agency, for example, has suggested additional protections ad-
dressing consumer privacy threats and advocated for them through 
workshops and reports.164 Legal action for data breach could be a 
means whereby the FTC might protect consumers. Based on available 
research, however, such actions mostly failed to prevent privacy threats 
and did nothing to limit insurers from leveraging wearable data in un-
derwriting or evaluating policyholders.165  
Ultimately, such disjointed regulatory authority coupled with a 
limited patchwork of data privacy laws, allows companies in possession 
of wearable data to remain largely in control of how generated data is 
used—often neglecting the interests of users.166 Such control is only 
marginally offset by the standard practice among companies to draft 
expansive privacy notices outlining any limitations that surround their 
collection and use of user data.167 More often than not, however, these 
privacy notices heavily skew toward shielding companies from liability 
for inadequate data protection.168 While many unanswered questions 
remain regarding whether and how the United States government 
might address this myriad of legal issues presented by wearables—one 
thing seems clear: that the era of unregulated data is likely coming to 
an end.169 
 
“help consumers spot, stop, and avoid scams and fraud.” Federal Trade Commission, USA.GOV, 
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/federal-trade-commission (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
 163. Id.; see also Troiano, supra note 1, at 1737. 
 164. For example, the FTC has suggested that companion application developers be re-
quired to “provide disclosures to users and obtain consent from users when collecting ‘sensitive 
information.’” Troiano, supra note 1, at 1738. 
 165. The FTC has brought several suits “against companies with allegedly deficient cyber-
security that failed to protect consumer data against hackers,” most of which settled. Id. at 1737. 
 166. Seth P. Berman, GDPR in the U.S.: Be Careful What You Wish For, GOVERNMENT 
TECHNOLOGY (May 23, 2018), https://www.govtech.com/analysis/GDPR-in-the-US-Be-
Careful-What-You-Wish-For.html. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. America Should Borrow from Europe’s Data-Privacy Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/05/america-should-borrow-from-europes-
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As the market for wearables continues to expand, device manufac-
turers and users alike need practical solutions that both protect con-
sumer privacy and promote technological advancement. Despite a 
consensus that personal health data be accurately measured and rea-
sonably protected, however, little agreement exists regarding how to 
balance the promotion of wearable technology and privacy rights. 
Some privacy advocates suggest the optimal path forward is for Amer-
ica to develop and adopt comprehensive regulation that mirrors a re-
cent European law, known as the GDPR.170 Broadly speaking, the 
GDPR171 regulates data protection and privacy for all individuals re-
siding in the European Union.172 Effective as of May 2018,173 this new 
data privacy law primarily aims to grant individuals greater control 
over their personal data while simplifying and unifying the regulatory 
landscape of the region.174 While in theory, the premise of the GDPR 
sounds requisite, both its complexity and series of extreme standards, 
discussed infra, make such a regulation ill-suited for application in the 
United States.175 Instead of adopting comprehensive regulation, the 
United States should only pursue regulatory solutions that promote 
commercial innovation, which is essential to reducing the high costs of 
health care. Such limited regulatory solutions—modeled after certain 
provisions of the GDPR—should focus on providing users with clear 
notice and consent regarding the privacy policies of applicable compa-
nies. Through this approach, the United States will strike a healthy 
balance between user privacy and commercial innovation. 
 
data-privacy-law. 
 170. Troiano, supra note 1, at 1748. 
 171. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119). 
 172. General Data Protection Regulation, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gen-
eral_Data_Protection_Regulation (last updated Nov. 23, 2018). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Why a Privacy Law Like GDPR Would be 
a Tough Sell in the U.S., WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/05/25/the-cybersecurity-202-why-a-privacy-la 
w-like-gdpr-would-be-a-tough-sell-in-the-us/5b07038b1b326b492dd07e83/?noredirect=on&ut 
m_term=.0fa3338ce6e6. The GDPR “requires companies that collect data on E.U. citizens to 
use simple language to explain how they handle it. Id. Companies must get explicit consent from 
consumers before doing anything with their information and allow them to request copies of 
their data or delete it entirely. Id. The law also mandates that companies report data breaches on 
strict timelines. Id. Fines for violations could cost them 4% of their global profits.” Id. 
 175. Berman, supra note 166; see also Hawkins, supra note 174. 
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Adopting regulation similar in complexity to the GDPR,176 for ex-
ample, would likely prove problematic for the United States given the 
high development and implementation costs required. From an imple-
mentation standpoint, a comparable regulation would impose two pri-
mary costs on applicable companies—data process reconfiguration and 
compliance.177 Research evaluating GDPR preparedness, for example, 
found that nearly two-thirds of affected companies expect the regula-
tion to “significantly change” their informational workflows and the 
average company budget necessary to achieve GDPR compliance ex-
ceeded nearly $13 million.178 A similar study estimated the regulation 
to collectively cost Fortune 500 companies nearly $7.8 billion—the 
majority of which is likely to be recurring—to adequately understand 
and comply with the new regulation.179 Such excessive reconfiguration 
and compliance costs may simply be too high a cost to pay, especially 
given the stifling effect such regulation could have on innovation. 
Those in favor of heightened regulations should also be warned that a 
major incentive for companies in developing innovative software and 
Internet of Things products is the high margins associated with selling 
large aggregated datasets that accompany the business model.180 Reg-
ulation that stifles innovation should be especially concerning for the 
health care industry, which desperately needs innovative solutions to 
help combat rising costs.181  
 In addition, regulation with standards as extreme as those of the 
GDPR would likely present inherent conflicts with America’s consti-
tutional principles and regulatory environment. The opening para-
graph of the GDPR, for example, “elevate[s] data privacy into the 
realm of individual rights,”182 with a subsequent chapter clarifying 
 
 176. America Should Borrow from Europe’s Data-Privacy Law, supra note 169. Critics ar-
gue that the GDPR is simply “too complex and tries to achieve too many things.” Id. 
 177. Will Rinehart, Should the US Adopt the GDPR, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT 
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://techliberation.com/2018/10/01/should-the-us-adopt-the-gdpr/. 
 178. Id. Another survey found that nearly 88% of companies spent more than $1 million 
on GDPR preparations, while 40% spent over $10 million. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. McKinsey analysts “estimate that a retailer embracing big data has the potential to 
increase its operating margin by more than 60 percent.” James Manyika et. al., Big Data: The 
Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Apr. 
11, 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/big-
data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation; see also Alan Lewis & Dan McKone, To Get More Value 
from Your Data, Sell It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/to-get-more-
value-from-your-data-sell-it/. 
 181. See Kellogg, supra note 15, at 77. 
 182. Berman, supra note 166. The opening paragraph of the GDPR states, “The protection 
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other fundamental rights surrounding data.183 Such rights would likely 
be considered “out of step with America’s constitutional guarantee of 
free speech.”184 Similarly, another section of the GDPR allows only for 
the processing of personal data “if [the data] fits into one of only six 
legal basis”—with any other processing deemed illegal by default.185 
Moreover, the regulation creates a regulatory framework that man-
dates steep penalties for failure to comply (i.e., the greater of €20 mil-
lion186 or 4% of the offender’s global revenue).187 Such monumental 
fines significantly outweigh even the largest data breach lawsuit settle-
ments in the United States.188 From a regulatory standpoint, no gov-
ernment agency in America exists or has been granted clear authority 
to implement such a regulation.189 In contrast, European Union mem-
ber states have data privacy authorities to enforce the GDPR.190 Thus, 
America, in many ways, maintains “an antiquated policymaking infra-
structure” that is more like “a patchwork of controls [with] no unifying 
principles and no unifying institutions to coordinate policy.”191 Our 
politically gridlocked government encounters challenge enough when 
 
of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental human right.” 
Id.; see also Council Regulation, supra note 171. 
 183. Berman, supra note 166. The third section of the GDPR entitled, “Rights of data sub-
jects,” outlines the following rights: “the right to access data; the right to correct mistaken data; 
the right to move data to another platform or provider; the right to restrict or prohibit processing 
of data; and, most controversially, the right to erasure (sometimes called ‘the right to be forgot-
ten’).” Id.; see also Council Regulation, supra note 171. 
 184.  America Should Borrow from Europe’s Data-Privacy Law, supra note 169. 
 185. Berman, supra note 166. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. The GDPR effectively mandates that applicable companies “hire a Data Protection 
Officer, regularly engage in Privacy Impact Assessment, include certain clauses in their contracts 
with third-parties, partially restrict the transfer of personal data outside the European Union, 
and provide both a government enforcement mechanism and a private right of action for those 
who believe they have had their data rights violated. . . . [the regulation] also requires reporting 
in the case of a data breach, and provides a very short window (72 hours) for companies to make 
this report.” Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Hawkins, supra, note 174. In America, the closest equivalent to data privacy authorities 
in European Union member states is likely the FTC, which is considered “the main agency that 
enforces U.S. privacy policy” though “its powers are thin compared to its European counterparts” 
and “has little to no oversight over a range of businesses and industries, including airlines, uni-
versities, nonprofit organizations and banks.” Id. According to William Kovacic—a former gen-
eral counsel, member, and chair of the FTC during the Obama and Bush administrations—the 
FTC could try to “use its rulemaking authority to promulgate a set of commands,” but “there’s 
no public institution in the U.S. that has that breadth of authority, and that’s a big gap.” Id. 
 191. Id. 
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attempting to pass simple legislation—so expecting Congress to ap-
prove a regulation as complex as the GDPR seems quite unrealistic, 
especially when considering inherent conflicts.192 Further, any such 
regulation would likely encounter significant resistance from powerful 
technology lobbyist groups,193 arguing that any implemented policy 
would instantly be outdated.194 Besides, even if America never adopted 
a regulation mirroring the GDPR, applicable companies with opera-
tions in Europe (or those that serve citizens of the European Union) 
would still be required to comply with its policies.195 For these reasons, 
developing and adopting a comprehensive regulation that mimics the 
GDPR is a less than ideal solution to the current gap in regulatory 
protection surrounding personal health data. 
 Still, a strong case can be made for copying select features of the 
GDPR that are likely to function effectively in America. One such fea-
ture is the GDPR’s requirement that companies provide users with 
clear notice and informed consent about the collection, use, and dis-
semination of personal information.196 Though no one wants technol-
ogy to develop at the snail’s pace of government, most Americans still 
hold strong views about the value of privacy in their everyday lives.197 
And such privacy plays a crucial role in human development by ensur-
ing individuals have “breathing room to engage in the process of . . . 
self-development,” albeit imperfectly.198 That process becomes espe-
cially important when it comes to health. After all, achieving optimal 
 
 192. Id. “Privacy legislation far less sweeping than the GDPR has stalled over and over in 
recent years. Legislation to create a federal standard for how companies and agencies report data 
breaches, for example, has repeatedly dead-ended—even after hackers stole the personal infor-
mation of 22 million federal workers from the White House Office of Personnel Management in 
2014.” Id. 
 193. Id. “Privacy legislation far less sweeping than the GDPR has stalled over and over in 
recent years. Legislation to create a federal standard for how companies and agencies report data 
breaches, for example, has repeatedly dead-ended—even after hackers stole the personal infor-
mation of 22 million federal workers from the White House Office of Personnel Management in 
2014.” Id. 
 194. Kellogg, supra note 15, at 77. 
 195. Hawkins, supra note 174; see also Nick Ismail, Should the US Adopt GDPR?, 
INFORMATION AGE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.information-age.com/us-adopt-gdpr-
123469401/. 
 196. Berman, supra note 166. 
 197. Madden & Rainie, supra note, 109. “[A] majority of Americans believe it is important 
- often ‘very important’ - that they be able to maintain privacy and confidentiality in common-
place activities of their lives.” Id. 
 198. Sadowski, supra note 130. 
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personal health often takes a lifetime of trial and error. Thus, preserv-
ing consumer privacy rights surrounding wearables data serves the 
public interest.  
For example, wearable manufacturers could be required to provide 
clear notice to users regarding what personal information is being col-
lected,199 how it will be used,200 and with whom it will be shared.201 
Though such notice is already commonly presented to users through 
traditional privacy policies,202 few people actually read such policies 
due to excessive length and confusing jargon. A recent study, for ex-
ample, found that only 16% of Internet users consistently read privacy 
policies of the websites and services with which they share infor-
mation.203 Moreover, if all Internet users in the United States read the 
privacy policy when visiting a website for the first time, each person 
would expend nearly 244 hours per year—or forty minutes per day.204 
Despite these staggering statistics, perhaps the most significant prob-
lem with privacy policies is that they attempt to serve widely different 
functions for multiple parties.205 Companies, for example, use privacy 
policies to limit liability and demonstrate compliance, but regulators 
use them for legal enforcement.206 Meanwhile, consumers are often 
neglected and left relatively uninformed in making decisions about 
their privacy.207 Since most privacy policies are neither intelligible nor 
accessible, many drastically limit consumer choice beyond simply us-
ing or not using the service.208 For that reason, most users provide their 
data to companies in exchange for free or reduced-cost services with 
few limitations, if any, on how the company uses their data.209  
 
 199. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the FTC, suggests “the question is not whether con-
sumers should be given a say over unexpected uses of their data; rather, the question is how to 
provide simplified notice and choice.” Kellogg, supra note 15, at 78. 
 200. Jessica Kitain, Beware of Wearables: Protecting Privacy in a Data-Collecting World, 
9 DREX. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 26 (2016). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Chris Morran, 1-In-5 Internet Users Always Read Privacy Policies, but That Doesn’t 
Mean They Understand What They’re Reading, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 28, 2012), https:// 
consumerist.com/2012/11/28/1-in-5-internet-users-always-read-privacy-policies-but-that-does 
nt-mean-they-understand-what-theyre-reading/. 
 204. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 
4 I/S: A J. OF L. & POL’Y 543, 563 (2008). 
 205. Nobody Reads Privacy Policies, supra note 126. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Berman, supra note 166. 
(7) NASH.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:46 PM 
197] Wearables 
225 
In response to these challenges, many are calling for more practical 
and consumer friendly privacy policies that enable more meaningful 
choices among users.210 Similar to the GDPR, which requires privacy 
policies to use “clear and plain language” and to be in a “concise, trans-
parent, intelligible and easily accessible form,”211 companies could 
be required to provide clearer language.212 Such requirements could 
empower users with more dynamic choices regarding their personal 
data. A starting point for developing more consumer friendly privacy 
policies is to make them more relevant and actionable.213 For example, 
a company could divide an otherwise lengthy privacy policy into 
smaller subsections to be delivered to users during contextually appro-
priate times rather than all at once.214 To help users process the smaller 
subsections, companies could incorporate scrollable content, pop-
up screens, or large readable text.215 Emphasizing the collection of 
“unexpected or surprising types of data” is another effective way to en-
hance choice through notice.216 Wearable manufacturers could also 
present users the option of having their geolocation tracked or require 
explicit approval for each external entity with whom they may share 
personal data.217 Such features could easily be applied to consents as 
well (e.g., pop-up notifications and click through options).218 Addition-
ally, keeping users informed of any changes after initial consent and 
maintaining accurate records of such—while always allowing users the 
option of withdrawing consent—is paramount to an effective privacy 
policy.219 Adopting these types of features could transition wearable 
manufacturers from their archaic all-or-nothing privacy policies220 to 
moredynamic contracts that give users real choices.221 Equipping oth-
erwise ignorant users with enhanced knowledge and options would 
not only increase transparency, but also build trust in the expanding 
wearables market.  
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Nobody Reads Privacy Policies, supra note 126. 
 212. Kitain, supra note 200, at 27. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Nobody Reads Privacy Policies, supra note 126. 
 217. Kitain, supra note 200, at 27. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Nobody Reads Privacy Policies, supra note 126. 
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As society continues to promote and embrace technological ad-
vancement, wearables are likely to remain at the heart of data moni-
toring, despite their apparent drawbacks. Considering the current lim-
its of America’s regulatory landscape, however, both commercial and 
regulatory entities should be thoughtful as they explore potential solu-
tions to the issues surrounding the generation and dissemination of 
personal health data—particularly data generated by wearables. Gov-
ernment should be especially cautious of comprehensive regulation 
since its stifling effect on innovation may impede commercial attempts 
to reduce health care costs and improve population health. Only 
through the pursuit of limited legislation emphasizing clear notice and 
consent from users will our country effectively strike a healthy balance 
between privacy and innovation. 
Erika J. Nash 
